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Abstract.
Large-scale commercial, industrial and financial operations are
becoming ever more interdependent, and ever more dependent on IT. At
the same time, the rapidly growing interconnectivity of IT systems, and
the convergence of their technology towards industry-standard hardware
and software components and sub-systems, renders these IT systems
increasingly vulnerable to malicious attack. This paper is aimed
particularly at readers concerned with major systems employed in
medium to large commercial or industrial enterprises. It examines the
nature and significance of the various potential attacks, and surveys the
defence options available. It concludes that IT owners need to think of
the threat in more global terms, and to give a new focus and priority to
their defence. Prompt action can ensure a major improvement in IT
resilience at a modest marginal cost, both in terms of finance and in
terms of normal IT operation.
Index Terms: Security, Dependability, Cryptography, Networked Systems, Crime
Protection
21. Introduction
1.1. Background
Industry, government and indeed society are becoming critically dependent on
IT [1; 2]. This dependence is illustrated by the serious concerns which are now being
caused by residual “Year 2000” bugs. Seeing that even these conceptually-simple
software faults are demanding massive resources, we must be concerned about the much
more difficult effects of “cyber crimes": malicious activities by “hackers" or
organisations seeking to exploit or disrupt an IT system, for mischief, financial gain, or
more sinister motives [3] .
Such cyber crimes cannot be considered separately for individual systems,
because of the rapidly growing interconnectivity between IT systems, via Intra-nets,
Extra-nets and the Internet itself, as well as by direct physical interconnection, or
exchangeable storage media such as diskettes. Such interconnectivity (often unintended,
rarely adequately planned) turns separate IT systems into components of what is in
effect a single large super-system that might suffer an overall failure, or whose data or
software may be seriously polluted as a result of a single malicious act (or accident).
Indeed, with the growth of electronic funds transfer, just-in-time procurement,
concurrent engineering, etc., almost any organisation's or company's IT Infrastructure is
in danger of becoming an ill-defined part of an ill-defined global system, whose
configuration and operation are not under any effective overall control.
The increasing use of standard interfaces and protocols has provided major
advantages for the user community. At the same time, however, this facilitates the initial
access for an attacker. The widespread use of virtually standard data-bases, spread-
sheets and other generic software applications and components, and of standard
hardware processors, together with the continuing evolution and dissemination of
hacking tools and techniques, makes the attacker's subsequent deeper penetration into
our IT systems ever easier (see Fig. 1). Furthermore, such attacks are difficult to detect
and harder to trace to their source, and the hacker can work from a location where he (or
she?) is essentially safe from legal retribution, thus making such attacks ever more
tempting.
For example, it has been reported in the USA that there were at least 250,000
attacks on Department of Defense computers in 1995. (Possibly there were many more:
estimates are difficult, since many attempts are undiscovered and many others, albeit
discovered, are not reported.) Of the known attacks 65% were successful, and the
number of attacks is doubling each year. “Attackers have seized control of entire
Defense systems, many of which support critical functions, such as weapons systems
research and development, logistics, and finance. Attackers have also stolen, modified,
and destroyed data and software.” [4] . Reported attacks on commercial systems
include one by a group of hackers who were caught and convicted of breaking into
computers of Bank of America, South-western Bell, Martin Marietta, and TRW
Information Services, and selling information, such as credit reports, that they so
3obtained [5]. In the UK there has been a defensive tendency to downplay or deny the
seriousness of cyber crime, and to keep quiet about embarrassing occurrences. Even so,
there have been enough publicly admitted incidents to make it clear that cyber crime
threatens us all. (For example it has been claimed that UK banks have suffered losses
amounting to £500 million through ransom payments or having to suspend activity as a
result of hacking attacks [6] .)
The potential seriousness of cyber crime is even greater if it affects critical IT
systems of telecommunications, power distribution, banking or transport, i.e. of the
infrastructure on which virtually all individual companies depend (see Fig. 2). Such
concerns led the US President to set up a Commission on Critical Infrastructures [7].
However, in this paper we deal solely with the defence of corporate IT systems.
Some major IT systems are of such evident critical importance to the
organisations that own them that these systems employ hardware and sometimes also
software redundancy to ensure system availability, use encryption to maintain
information integrity and confidentiality, are operated under careful management, and
have well thought-out disaster recovery plans for situations when major failures do
nevertheless occur. However, the main concern is usually accidental hardware or
software faults, or operational errors. Few civil organisations have devoted much effort
to defence against deliberate cyber threats. However, this threat is real and growing, and
there are useful steps which can and should be taken to provide improved defence
against it.
This general survey paper focusses on computer/IT systems, and is aimed
particularly at readers concerned with major systems employed in medium to large
commercial or industrial enterprises. It is a sequel to [8], commissioned by the IEE 10
years ago, which gave a comprehensive overview of the role of cryptographic devices
and concepts in the design of communications systems: to protect their information,
authenticate their subscribers and messages; and prevent, impede or at least detect
various forms of disruptive or deceptive interference with network operation. Other
papers, such as [9; 10], treat design principles to protect IT systems against accidental -
or maliciously caused - hardware or software failure, and much effort continues to be
devoted to testing and verification techniques for both hardware [11; 12] and software
[13; 14]. A few articles, such as [15], also address the crucial issue of the management
and operation of systems, so as to realise and maintain the potential security benefits of
these design features. All these publications focus primarily on the protection of an
identifiable system or network, even though this may include many and diverse
subsystems or subnets.
However, industrial, commercial and administrative processes and IT systems
are becoming more and more interdependent:-
Any equipment, system or activity is at risk, if it depends, directly or
indirectly, on any other equipment, system or activity which depends
on computers or communications for its operation, control
monitoring or management.
4Thus a system may be at risk due to a technical or procedural failure, an accident, or a
malicious act affecting someone else's system (see Fig. 3). Conversely, in defining,
designing and operating our own systems, we have to be aware of our moral
responsibility to all those other people, organisations and operations who might suffer
incidentally, as a result of an IT failure in our system. In this paper, we discuss the risks
to IT systems, and ways to contain these risks. Since robustness in the face of technical
failure is already receiving considerable attention, this paper deals with the risks of
malicious attack on IT systems, and ways to detect and cope with, or to prevent, such
attacks. (The planned revision of BS 7799, the widely accepted standard for information
security, gives this topic extra urgency.)
1.2. The Present Situation.
In commerce, industry and the public utilities there are now numerous systems
of systems - which, as regards their security features,:
∞ are a haphazard collection of disparate, poorly-structured sub-systems,
∞ have evolved in an unplanned manner,
∞ and are often used and managed with little regard to their security.
 On the other hand, most of our industrial IT infrastructure is still sufficiently
fragmented that there remains a window of opportunity to guide its evolution towards
improved security through the progressive introduction of components, such as interface
controllers, that provide more effective defences in the face of hostile attack. When
properly implemented and managed, such interface controllers (guards, gateways and
firewalls) can greatly enhance the security of systems involving the following classes of
data flow - particularly where these do not already benefit from end-to-end encryption:-
∞ Those flowing “transparently” across a constituent system or network,
∞ Those traversing interfaces between systems and human or processor “users”,
∞ Those at interfaces between systems or subsystems.
TABLE 1: Signal/Data flows benefiting from interface controllers.
As discussed in section 6, these interface controllers are a crucial tool, but their
design, placement and management involves financial and operational trade-offs, and
they are no panacea. On the other hand, there are also practical steps for enhancing the
security within existing systems or sub-systems. The scope for some of these options
may be restricted by past decisions, but much can still be done, often at relatively modest
cost. Certainly little cost is involved in producing quite effective user-friendly security
monitoring and control interfaces and good security-training material, and to inculcate
users and managers with an awareness of their security responsibilities.
5In the following sections we discuss the principal threats and possible counters
to them. Whilst some distinction is made between attacks on communications and
computers, we note that the nodal switches and the communications network-controllers
and management systems are computers, distributed computer systems are
interconnected by communications networks, and indeed single computers commonly
rely on communications for many of their inputs and outputs, and even the “buses"
interconnecting their modules are basically local-area networks.
Sections 2 - 5 deal with various “passive" and “active" attacks on
communications and the corresponding defences. Sections 6 - 9 cover the same subject
in relation to computers, sections 10 - 16 deal with management and policy aspects of IT
security, and section 17 draws conclusions.  Passive and active attacks are defined,
pictorially, in Figs. 4 and 5 respectively.
2. Unauthorised Interception
Interception of communications is normally undetectable and, in the absence of
suitable countermeasures, offers a tempting target to attackers. In appropriate computer
systems, unauthorised access to data-bases, etc., can be monitored and, where this has
been done, it has produced ample evidence that probing attacks are indeed taking place
on a substantial and increasing scale. In the present context we regard all attacks which
solely seek to gain information, from communications or computers, as “passive”. We
distinguish five types of such passive attacks - see TABLE 2:
Type of attack Comment
random (fishing) attack on
message or file content
• random attack on plain text is quick and easy
• countered by encryption
“Space-Domain” analysis
of organisational structure
∞ needs sustained effort, but attack is otherwise easy
∞ difficult to counter
∞ pre-requisite for the three forms of attack
listed below
“Time-Domain” traffic-
flow analysis
• needs sustained effort, but attack is otherwise easy
• a little harder still to counter
message interception or data
extraction targeted onto key
parts of the system
• must be countered by high-grade encryption
systematic, system-wide
message interception
or data hacking
• needs substantial, sustained high-grade effort by
attacker
• must be countered by high-grade encryption
TABLE 2: Passive Attacks
Whilst, in the absence of suitable defensive measures - see below - a fortuitous
probing attack can often produce some results within minutes or even seconds, the final
three classes of passive attacks, when directed at a large, complex system or network,
may need a prolonged “reconnaissance” and analysis of relevant parts of the system's
6architecture. Similarly, attacks to produce a major disruption of service - discussed in
later sections - will generally have to be preceded by a thorough “reconnaissance”
(except for self-spreading “virus” infections, if not limited by secure interfaces).
However, the resultant attack can then often be activated in a fraction of a second.
The principal defence options are listed briefly below:
Defence against interception of trunk links:
• Bulk encryption. This can normally be implemented at relatively low cost, even
retrospectively, and should be a standard feature in all networks carrying
identifiable critical traffic.
Defence against attack on decrypted redistribution nodes:
• Physical & personnel security. This should be - and mostly is - a “matter-of-
course” for all significant facilities.
• Routine end-to-end encryption of selected virtual links. This entails the creation
of an appropriate key-distribution system - which may use “public-key
cryptography” - but it can then be superposed in a “transparent” manner on a
network - including its encrypted trunk links (i.e. super-encryption) - for the
duration of relevant connection session. It should be a standard facility for
traffic or users of particular criticality or sensitivity. (The segregation of
signalling in a separate channel facilitates this, but increases vulnerability to
some other forms of attack.)
Protection of sensitive connection sessions:
• End-to-end (super)-encryption. This is a variant of the preceding technique,
applying it only to those connection sessions judged to warrant it
Defence against Analysis of Organisational Structure:
• Masking differences in traffic type or volume between different organisational
entities.
• Avoidance of distinctive emissions.
• Defence against traffic-flow analysis (see below).
• Using interface controllers to hide internal systems and network configurations
It is frequently worth-while to make structure analysis harder for the attacker, but rarely
practical to make it impossible.
Defences against traffic-flow analysis.
In some critical situations, in public or corporate governance, the mere existence
of a very non-standard pattern of traffic flow could give away sensitive information. If
necessary, we may impede or prevent such analysis by:
• Dummy traffic.
• Dummy “post-box” addressees - interface controllers can sometimes also
subsume this function.
• Filling non-busy links with “empty” key stream.
• Encryption of trunk signalling channels.
7This would be warranted only for a few, particularly sensitive, types of traffic.
Diversion and Deception
Another defence against passive attack is that of diverting the energies of
hackers into ʻdummyʼ sub-systems of no strategic value but which are designed to
appear attractive to those who are attempting to penetrate the systems concerned. Simple
examples of such strategies are the ʻdummyʼ password files now often seen on systems
subject to external access. At a more sophisticated level, some critical Internet-connected
organisations have established significant ʻdummyʼ resources for such diversionary
purposes. Such approaches can be costly, but they also have the advantage of
encouraging an attack to continue so that it can be analysed without putting real data at
risk.
3. Interference with Communications
Various forms of interference with communications may also be encountered,
either ʻmerelyʼ aiming to cause mayhem or for fraud or blackmail. All cause the receipt
of incorrect messages or prevent the receipt of the correct messages (a form of "denial
of service"). The principal forms of such “active” attacks are listed in TABLE 3.
causing delivery of incorrect
messages
• false retransmission of true messages
• diversion of true messages
• false attribution of true messages
• generation of “spoof” messages
interference with message
content
• cropping
• modification
interference with network
(for degradation or denial of
service)
• saturation
• “fouling-up” switches
• “fouling up” the network management system
interference with
synchronisation
(mainly in radio systems)
• attacking message synchronisation
• attacking crypto synchronisation
TABLE 3: Active Attacks
Some of these attacks may be limited in scope, e.g. to a single communications
link or a single local computer or a single type of transaction, or they may be limited in
the duration of their impact. On the other hand, attacks which immobilise network-
control or destroy confidence in the traffic carried would have a very grave pervasive
impact, until countered, and so resilience against such attacks is of high importance. As
far as we know, none of these active attacks have yet been deployed for criminal,
political or terrorist purposes. However, all have been discussed in the literature, and the
vulnerability of many important systems to such attacks has been proven by “tiger
teams” emulating potential attackers. As shown below, most of these active attacks can
be prevented by the appropriate use of crypto techniques, coupled with good, active
security management. However some (such as interference with synchronisation) can
8merely be detected and made more difficult, and others (such as partial or complete
deletion of messages) can only be detected.
Defence against malicious retransmission of formerly valid messages:
• Time-dependent crypto key - or at least encrypted time stamp and serial number.
Where the end-to-end links are already encrypted, this entails no extra cost.
Defence against receipt of incorrect message, due to diversion or false attribution of true
messages, or to masquerading to send “spoof” messages:
• Authenticated end-to-end session crypto keys.
Where the end-to-end links are already encrypted, backed by an appropriate key-
distribution system, this entails no extra cost.
Defence against malicious system saturation:
• Detection and rejection of spoof messages (see above).
• Limitations on traffic accepted:
• from any one source,
• and/or to any one destination,
• and/or on any one link.
This entails the use of a trusted gateway but, where this is used for its wider security
benefits, it involves no further cost.
Detection of deletion or diversion of message:
• Encrypted serial numbering plus minimum frequency of channel-testing
messages.
Where the end-to-end links are already encrypted, this entails no extra cost other than
that of introducing the test-message generation protocol.
Detection of message cropping or modification:
• Encrypted parity checks or “digests”.
No problem (other than the parity processing) if the connection is encrypted.
Jamming of radio systems is a well-understood threat, and we do not discuss it
here. However, note that interference with critical synchronisation functions could be a
more subtle and much more potent threat, equivalent in its effect to jamming.
Protection of network operation and management
• Isolate signalling traffic from user traffic
• Isolate operation and configuration management traffic from signalling traffic.
The options for such isolation are listed in Table 4 (by courtesy of M. Ward [16]):
• Separate parts of same packet (e.g. “connectionless” operation),
• Separate packets in same stream (e.g. Asynchronous Transfer Mode),
• Separate streams in same wavelength (e.g. Synchronous Digital Hierarchy),
• Separate wavelength in same fibre,
9• Separate fibre in same cable,
• Separate cable in same duct,
• Separate ducts in same route,
• Route diversity.
Table 4: Degrees of Isolation of Functions
4. Physical Attacks Against the Bearer Net
We also have to consider attacks against the physical bearer net. Terrestrial
networks have at least the potential for a very high degree of redundancy in their
capacity and topology/cross-connectivity. The proper exploitation of this potential
robustness requires:
1. Monitoring the availability and capacity of the various links,
2. Adaptive routing,
3. Prioritisation,
4. Possibly adaptation of operational procedures to tailor traffic load to the capacity
available,
5. If necessary, restriction of access rights for lower-priority traffic.
Facilities 1 and 2 are normally quite good. Crude versions of 3 and possibly also of 5
exist in many networks. Facility 4, a potentially powerful form of adaptation to network
damage, is insufficiently planned and practised. “Fixed” telecommunications networks
are generally sufficiently redundant to be quite resilient to damage to trunks or nodes -
or to jamming of terrestrial or satellite radio links. Subject to any capacity impairment
by jamming, satellite links can also make a major contribution to network reconstitution
or reconfiguration. Unfortunately, it is not uncommon for functionally independent
trunks to be physically collocated (for at least part of their route), or for switches to be
accommodated side-by side in the same building. However, contractual or financial
incentives might persuade communications operators to adopt more defensible
dispositions.
A low-capacity backbone network of assured survivability is typically required,
both to control the reconfiguration and restitution of the main communications
infrastructure and, pending such action, to provide an assured route for a minimum of
vital operational communications.
5. Attacks Against Crypto Systems
Crypto systems play a critical role in maintaining the security of IT systems
against unauthorised reception and exploitation. Furthermore, they are also key
components in:
• authentication,
• preventing various subtle attempts to pervert the communications process,
• security in data bases,
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• imposing security restrictions on inputs to, outputs from, or interactions between
computer hardware or software modules.
Thus their very ubiquitous application and importance could make them tempting targets
for attack.
Various forms of attack can be envisaged, involving decryption, physical
interference with crypto equipment, or interference with key management or distribution.
All of these can be countered by the combination of means listed in TABLE 5:
• Sound COMSEC (COMmunications SECurity) design,
• Safe key distribution and management,
• Simple and well-conceived COMSEC operating procedures,
• Good operational COMSEC discipline,
• Automatic alarms when equipment or humans perform incorrectly,
• Monitoring of the compliance with those procedures which cannot be covered
adequately by automatic alarms.
• Prompt and decisive action in response to any defects so discovered.
TABLE 5: Requirements for a secure crypto system
However, COMSEC systems may have to leave some scope for law-
enforcement agencies to monitor secret but critical activities of major criminal
organisations and the like, giving rise to tricky technical and political,issues [17].
The security of high-grade encryption-systems does not depend on secrecy of
the crypto algorithm, but merely on secrecy of the key used - the decryption key, in the
case of public-key cryptography. However, in the design of sophisticated cryptographic
algorithms and security protocols, is it is easy to make subtle mistakes - which then can
have a disastrous impact on the security achieved. Hence is it essential to subject such
algorithms and protocols to extensive review and scrutiny and test, before bringing them
into use. Historically, in many custom systems designs, such scrutiny has been missing,
often leaving major weaknesses undetected [18].
Both public and private key cryptographic systems are vulnerable to a number of
forms of attack in which large scale computing resources are used to recover the keys in
use.  In the case of private key systems a ʻbrute forceʼ search of the key space is an
increasingly common form of attack using either networked computing resources or
even dedicated hardware search engines.  For many public key systems the most
efficient attacks are achieved by solving the underlying mathematical problem, a task
which is generally much easier than a search of the key space.  In considering the
strength of cryptographic algorithms, especially those designed to provide long-term
protection, we thus have to take account of both increases in computing power and
improvements in mathematical analysis and algorithm design. For example, the
existence of the RSA public key system, with its dependence on the hard problem of
factoring large composite numbers, has spurred research in factorisation to the point
where keys thought to be safe for decades are now being regularly broken.
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On the other hand, even such breaking of the decryption key corresponding to a
public key becomes a practical threat only if the attacker can focus his collection effort
on traffic to the relevant target, or at any rate on a traffic stream which includes a
significant proportion of such traffic. This may well be frustrated by the growing
volume of global traffic, and by the various system-wide COMSEC measures, impeding
selective traffic collection, discussed towards the end of this section.
A significant difficulty with the current implementations of public key
cryptography is that they encourage the extensive, long term reuse of a fixed key.  In
this situation it takes only one successful attack on the key, or one security lapse which
exposes this key, to allow an attacker to read all past, present and future messages
encrypted with this key.  This weakness can be significantly reduced by encrypting
messages with a ʻrandomʼ session key that is used only once and then destroyed.  The
problem then becomes one of how this key is shared between the message originator
and its recipients. One way of achieving this is to rely on a key distribution centre to
pass this key to those who need it using either physical means or, possibly, an electronic
key distribution system.  Clearly the latter has to be designed to a very high security
standard and this is a very demanding task.  An alternative is to use a key sequence
generation algorithm that allows the originator and the recipients to independently
generate the same sequence of keys.  And, going still further, it is possible to use public
key protocols to exchange such keys securely on a bilateral basis.  The central principle
here is not only to make the cost of an attack as high as possible, but also to limit the
gains that an attacker will make if they succeed in an attack.
Another important principle is to build in a number of layers of defence so that,
for example:
• trunks are bulk-encrypted,
• signalling channels are encrypted,
• addresses, routing indicators and location registers are encrypted or otherwise
not accessible to the attacker,
• a substantial proportion of traffic is end-to-end encrypted (not necessarily to
high standards),
so that any attacker has to solve a number of challenges in order to read encrypted
traffic.
This emphasises the complementary nature of all aspects of system security
architecture and policy. Utmost care is needed to deny the attacker the chance of
focused data collection at critical terminals and links and, throughout the total network
or system, we must deny him access to any easy discriminant, which might help him to
pick the nuggets from the dirt.
Even the security of a basically sound design schema can be undermined by the
fortuitous introduction of exploitable weaknesses during implementation. Furthermore,
many security protocols are currently implemented in packaged commercial software
which is not designed - and indeed probably cannot be designed - to the appropriate
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level of assurance. Hence, for high-level security, such protocols will need dedicated
hardware. Even then, tampering with the crypto device may not be beyond the capability
of a small - albeit high-calibre - electronics facility [2,3], and hence good physical
security is essential.
Needless to say, the COMSEC architecture and policy should, wherever
possible, be an integral part of system design ab initio, and good COMSEC discipline
and management must be an integral part of subsequent system operation.
6. Software Attacks on Computers
Much of the most vulnerable traffic flow is to, from or between computers.
Computer systems generally comprise discrete hardware and software modules,
intercommunicating via “buses” or networks. Hence their defence has much in
common with that of communications systems. However, even more than in
Communications, most computer hardware and software is produced with no close
control over its security features and, moreover, computers are vulnerable to self-
propagating “virus” or other infections. Furthermore, attacking an allegedly “secure”
computer system represents the same sort of challenge to to-day's youngsters as
climbing an “unclimbable" mountain-face - but with far more opportunities to make the
attempt - and much smaller risk:- There is almost unlimited scope for placing space,
time and logic cut-outs between the attacker and the actual point of attack (and there
may, depending on the jurisdictions involved, be only limited scope for sanctions if and
when an attacker in another country is identified). Moreover, many free-lance hackers
publicise their successful methods, via the Internet or otherwise, thus encouraging others
to use their methods - and to “improve” upon them. Hence there is an enormous pool
of skilled hackers whom the serious attackers can recruit, for fraud, industrial espionage,
blackmail, sabotage, etc..
There has been extensive research on formal techniques and on associated tools,
such as theorem provers and proof-checkers - and on generalised Boolean methods to
make designs more amenable to formal analysis, and formal methods can now make
some contribution to confirming the internal consistency of the initial specification and
to validating the conformity of hardware or software modules of moderate complexity to
that formal specification. However, they can do little to validate the correctness or
completeness of the set of requirements embodied in the specification; e.g. no formal
method would have detected the “Year-2000 bug”. Validation still depends
predominantly on well-designed empirical statistical tests. Furthermore virtually all
existing test tools can be fairly readily misused to look for weak spots to attack. Most
commercial systems - despite reasonably strict specifications and quite intensive
functional validation - are far from provably secure. At best they were checked against a
list of known threats (but rarely rechecked after subsequent hardware or software
changes or against new or newly recognised threats).
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Hence any defence must be based on the insertion of a dedicated “trusted”
computers and dedicated “trusted” software, at critical points and interfaces. Here the
word “trusted” implies that these systems are:
• As limited in functionality, and hence as simple, as possible,
• As rigorously validated and tested as possible,
• Subject to rigorous "cradle-to-grave" hardware and software configuration
control,
• Covered by good physical and personnel security,
• Possibly “diversely” duplicated or triplicated (i.e. employing different hardware
and different software) where their roles make this appropriate.
Probably few, if any, computers, as currently procured, installed, maintained,
programmed, or operated, meet these criteria in full but, subject to proper control of the
foregoing aspects, it is possible to install and operate an effective trustworthy dedicated
interface controller.
Clearly, assurance of the continued integrity of these “trusted” sub-systems is
vital. Various technical checks can validate the initial design or detect any subsequent
unauthorised hardware or software modifications. All settings, etc., may be subject to
dual-key access, but this merely provides traceability, if one of the two independent key-
holders then operates independently inside the system.
In many circumstances the continuity of system operation, and the integrity of
data, are much more important security considerations than data confidentiality. Modern
distributed systems depend on databases for naming, for routing and for holding such
things as public key certificates and other more, general directory information. Here
there is no requirement for confidentiality (indeed, just the opposite) but any lack of
system availability, or any accidental or deliberate data corruption, will have a damaging
impact on the operation of the system as a whole. In such situations data replication is a
very important and valuable defensive technique.
Since it would be difficult to introduce mutually-consistent unauthorised
modifications simultaneously into several distinct systems, the trusted computers might
be triplicated, for the most critical applications, with different hardware and different
software, so as to give an alarm when one response differs from the other two, and to
veto access when all three differ [19]. Simpler variants might use only two systems,
looking for agreement, or employ either just diverse duplicate hardware or (more likely)
diverse duplicate software. The extra procurement cost of such software replication may
be mitigated by the substantially lower standard of design and security validation then
acceptable in the constituent systems. However, it should be noted that the
implementation of replication can be quite challenging in complex situations, especially
where there is a need to allow for non-determinacy (see for example Chapter 6 in [20]).
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The system is then split into the smallest acceptable physical and/or functional
elements, with all data and control flows to, from or between these elements routed
through the trusted controllers, which regulate, with the tightest operationally tolerable
restrictions:
• Who (user, terminal or device) can “talk” to whom,
• As a member of which defined user community,
• At what security level,
• On what subject category
• In what data format,
• At what peak and mean data-rates,
• With what message lengths and message frequencies.
TABLE 6: Traffic-flow controls at a secure gateway
(The commercial “firewall” computers [21], widely used to isolate corporate
systems from the Internet, are a particular case of such interface controllers. Although
the trust placed in such firewalls may often be excessive, the better ones do perform a
valuable function, when properly set up and managed.)
Modular partitioning, with well-defined interfaces, is in fact “best practice" for
the design, management and evolutionary upgrading of IT systems. Conversely,
however, it can be difficult for interface controllers to function effectively, if introduced
retrospectively into ill-structured systems engaged in complex tasks. Even when part of
the initial system design, these controllers must maintain a balance between a (probably)
vastly improved residual performance in hypothetical hostile environments and a
(certainly) somewhat degraded normal performance in the present benign environment.
The controllers also maintain a log of all potentially sensitive traffic, and give an
alert for anomalous patterns of transactions. A central organisation must then collate and
analyse the global pattern of alerts from groups of controllers, and take prompt action in
response - supported by prior contingency planning and by periodic exercises.
Any messages, authenticated by their encryption as coming from a trustworthy
source, retain the trustworthiness of that source, irrespective of the message type or of
the transmission route. Otherwise, however, even messages or files which do not
themselves include any executable commands may be able to trigger such commands or
otherwise modify the state of the receiving system. Hence all such traffic can potentially
carry communicable “diseases”, such as “viruses”, and one important function of
interface controllers is to act as “quarantine” stations preventing such infections
spreading beyond sub-system or system boundaries. The growing convergence of
computer hardware and software designs onto a small number of industry standards
eases the task of these interface controllers but, on the other hand, it increases the impact
of any “successful" infection.
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In the absence of appropriate cryptographic protection, assumptions as to which
data sources are trustworthy and how viral infections may be recognised must be
constantly up-dated, in a continuing battle of wits with the designers of viruses.
Furthermore, as with conventional quarantine, boundary controls can greatly reduce the
risk of infection spreading across a border, but they do not eliminate it entirely, and they
can do nothing to control an infection already existing within one of the areas so
segregated (see Fig. 6).
The separation of processing modules by trusted interface controllers may be
likened to subdividing a warship by watertight bulkheads: We accept some extra
financial cost and impaired freedom of routine communication, as the price of reducing
the impact of an attack, from ʻdisastrousʼ to merely ʻembarrassingʼ. The project
sponsor, leader or user has to judge the right trade-offs between financial, operational,
and security desiderata. However, before risking the loss or corruption of an
“unimportant” data-source, link or function, he must be sure that it does not indirectly
affect a vital operation.
Whilst operational applications will generally employ normal commercial
hardware and software, some of the most critical ones might use trusted computers - or
at least use software and/or hardware diversity, and checking for identical results. The
recent trend towards centrally-held applications programs (including Java “applets"),
downloaded to simplified user terminals, increases physical vulnerability. However,
provided the transfer of the applications is cryptographically protected, this may permit
improved integrity assurance for these applications programs.
7. Insider Attacks
Within the bounds of a given, commercially- procured system, there can be little
defence - other than personnel security - against insider attack at or below this insider's
level of access rights. On the other hand, interface controllers can offer significant
protection against insider attack spreading beyond the borders of this system segment,
and in some system architectures, they could also play a role in preventing an insider
going beyond his authorised user group, function or security level.
However, the effectiveness of these encapsulating boundaries depends critically
on the interface controllers themselves, and on their system managers. Furthermore, the
smaller the element segments, the more is not only the aggregate cost of controllers and
their impact on a systemʼs functionality and acceptability, but also the greater is number
of system managers involved, and hence the harder is it to maintain a high level of
competence and personnel security for these security-system managers. A compromise
is inevitable.
The risk of “double-insider” attack by a corrupt security-system manager can
be very significantly reduced by “double-key” access, making changes in the
authorisation lists, authentication code lists and logs dependent on simultaneous joint
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action by two separate authorised people, with distinct personal authentication “keys”.
The price paid for this would be:
• Some reduction in operational flexibility,
• A somewhat increased workload for the security-system managers,
• Possibly some reduction in the morale of the security-system personal.
Protection from network-propagated malicious software is of little value if such
software can easily enter the system in other ways. Here the trend towards user-
controlled desktop computing resources has complicated the situation since those who
have effective ʻday to dayʼ control over these resources – that is the end users – rarely
understand the technicalities of the system. Even systems with sophisticated electronic
boundary controls have suffered badly from viruses introduced by their own users
uploading software onto their machines.
Education and effective policy measures can reduce this problem, but it takes
only a single lapse by a single employee to introduce a virus infection into a large
network-connected organisation. This is a particular problem where oppressive software
purchasing arrangements engender the temptation to bypass such controls. Worse than
this, draconian virus reporting procedures in practice often discourage users from
reporting the incidents they experience, thus leaving an infection to spread even when its
introduction has been recognised.
Hence, as already indicated, where important centralised information assets are
involved, trusted controllers are as relevant at the interface to the internal users as at that
to the external world. Such issues have led some organisations to conclude that
processing should move back towards centralised computer systems serving multiple
“dumb” terminals or “network computers”. Others, however, have moved virus
protection from their boundaries onto individual workstations, for the direct protection
of the end-users. In practice neither of these models seems likely to dominate future
thinking.
8. Physical Attacks on Computer Systems
Some forms of external hacking or insider attacks could render a computer
system completely inoperable. Although these may not involve any mechanical or
electrical damage to the hardware, their effect is similar, and hence is subsumed by this
discussion of defences against physical attacks.
Important computers may have somewhat better physical security protection
than many communications facilities. On the other hand, the redundancy in even critical
computer systems is normally the minimum for hardware fault tolerance and hence for
continuity of operation in the presence of accidental faults. Generally this gives them
less resilience to physical attack than is intrinsic in much of the telecommunications
infrastructure.
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Despite these difference of scale, the basic nature of the threat, and hence the
defences, are the same as for the communications network: segmentation to limit the
damage when a facility is lost, and redundancy (of data, programs, processing capacity
and connectivity) so that the function of the damaged facility can be taken over by an
alternative unit with minimal disruption (assuming the applications software is computer
independent). Hence computers and their users or user systems should be networked,
much like the communications infrastructure, and they need similar network
management (software and/or human) to control reconfiguration and possibly
adaptation of the modus operandi.
Special care has to be taken that any hardware and software involved in
providing, and perhaps automating, such recovery and reconfiguration is itself
impervious to attack, and to ensure that the various encryption and authentication
security features are maintained in reconfiguration, without opening an avenue for
attacking or bypassing them.
9. Data Bases
Replicating a data-base n-fold (normally n = 2 or 3) increases its availability by
many orders of magnitude. This does however impose special requirements for data-
base consistency [22], and careful attention to the replication problems already
mentioned in Section 6 above. If data integrity of the database is also ensured by regular
cross comparison of the total data content over a suitably secure link, or at least by
comparison of parities and “digests”, the databaseʼs integrity will also be dramatically
enhanced. On the other hand, the opportunities for - possibly unauthorised - insider
access to the data is increased n-fold, and the risk of unauthorised external access may
also be increased. The contents of files residing in data-bases, like those in transit, can
however be protected by encryption, provided all entitled to access to the information
have also access to the relevant decryption key, thus sharply reducing and (hopefully)
clearly defining those having potential access to these data .
 In most applications, the dramatic improvements in availability and integrity that
can be obtained will far outweigh the small increase in the risk to confidentiality, and
data replication is then a very important and valuable defensive technique. Indeed, in
some applications such as the databases holding public key certificates and naming,
routing and other directory information for distributed systems none of this information
need be kept confidential and indeed some must be publicly available, whilst any lack of
system availability, or any accidental or deliberate data corruption, would seriously
damage the operation of the whole system. (A case in point is the recent major
disruption to the Internet caused by accidental corruption of top-level domain naming
information [23].) At the other extreme, however, there are a (very) few ultra-sensitive
applications, such as a central store of “subscriber-unique” crypto keys, where the data
can be replaced by new ones, if necessary, but their secrecy must be absolutely
guaranteed, and then replication is clearly not desirable.
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Further, more subtle, problem arise when selective user access is provided to
databases that contain information at several different levels of confidentiality. For
instance, in a database containing confidential salary details, an employee allowed access
to his/her own salary information, but also to data summaries and to statistics on salaries
across organisational units, may be able to work out the salaries of their colleagues
without any direct access to this data. Identifying and limiting the conclusions that can
be drawn through such indirect mechanisms is no easy task! For these and other
reasons the design of secure databases is a challenging task, but one essential in the
evolving world of integrated operation and electronic commerce.
10. Trust Relationships and Security Protocols in Open Systems
In widely distributed information systems - including the global World Wide
Web - it is often necessary to establish exclusive relationships of mutual trust between
widely dispersed systems elements, thus permitting the dynamic formation of closed
domains within an otherwise open system and, in particular, to permit two-way
exchanges between unambiguously and undeniably identified users. This capability lies
at the heart of electronic commerce, and hence much effort has been expended on the
development of appropriate sophisticated cryptographic security protocols.
Clearly, secure data exchange within distributed systems brings major
advantages to its users. However, any data exchange entails some risks and
vulnerabilities - some of which are not fully understood, sometimes even by the
security-system designers and implementers - thus perhaps lulling the users into a false
sense of security.
Cryptographic security protocols permit the secure exchange of data on the
basis of a pre-existing relationship of trust. They cannot introduce trust where it does
not already exist. For example, in maintaining the confidentiality of data, it is essential to
authenticate the identities of those allowed access. This is commonly done using public
key cryptography in conjunction with the services of a "Trusted Third Party" (TTP) to
ʻcertifyʼ that a particular key is owned by a given, authenticated individual. (In more
structured networks, the key-distribution centre performs the same function.) Hence any
penetration of the TTP could open wide opportunities for cyber crime, and so technical,
physical and personnel security of TTPs is particularly important, and it is essential that
the mode of operation of TTPs is well defined and rigorously controlled, and that its
relevant aspects are also clearly understood by its users. Duplicating the TTPs at distinct
locations, for assured availability, could double the “targets” exposed to penetration for
data extraction but, if the two centres have a truly secure way of periodic cross-
comparison, for “diversity” operation, then - as in duplicated data bases - it might
greatly enhance the assurance of their data integrity.
11. The Human Element
Provided system design makes reasonable technical provision for security, the
greatest weakness remaining in the system is that of human failure to:
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• Obey the specified operating procedures,
• Observe and report suspicious circumstances, be they:
• "peculiar" messages or data,
• unreasonable system operating patterns,
• suspect human behaviour.
In the absence of a pervasive security culture, at all hierarchical levels, effective
defensive precautions may only be introduced or, if present, conscientiously maintained,
in the aftermath of a serious attack. An essential element of security is awareness
training of all relevant staff, including update briefings, when appropriate, and periodic
simulated attacks. (The traditional reluctance to let simulated degradation of IT
capability interfere with routine operations or with training may need to be curbed.)
With increasing “out-sourcing” of procurement, installation, maintenance and even
operation of IT systems, personnel security, training, briefing and exercising may be as
relevant to external contractors as to a company's own personnel. The rotation of
contractor staff between their employer's various projects, can make the problems of
security vetting and security training of that staff more difficult than for intramural
personnel. (However, it may be possible to include, in extra-mural contracts, an
appropriate security “duty of care”, together with stringent penalties for infringements.)
12. Defence in Depth
A major electronic attack on a large distributed communications, computer or
data-base, system, e.g. for terrorist purposes, may require careful and detailed covert
intelligence collection and analysis and mission planning, just like physical attacks.
However, many of the resulting attacks can then be implemented in seconds - if not
milliseconds. A defence in depth will therefore comprise:-
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• Direct resilience to attack,
• Partially automated provision for recovery after attack,
• Resistance to reconnaissance data collection,
• Resistance to effective analysis and interpretation of any data collected,
∞ Effective maintenance of defence, e.g.
• applying new security patches to software,
•  monitoring password files for insecure practices,
• Monitoring to detect passive intrusions (or active interference),
• Noting the methods of attack, and assessing the results obtained by the attacker,
• Collating the results of monitoring from multiple sites and occasions, and
analysing them for patterns,
• Trying to identify the attacker and/or his target, and taking appropriate protective
or pre-emptive measures.
TABLE 7: Elements of Defence in Depth
This must be backed up by regular “friendly” probing attacks:
• to test the validity and effectiveness of the defence-measures,
• to discover and evaluate any overlooked “holes” in the defence,
• to keep the human element of the defence “on their toes”.
Security assurance is not a matter of once-for-all certification, but of continued
reassessment, as the system's configuration, its connectivity, its function, its utilisation,
its operating procedures - and potential methods of attack - all evolve dynamically. The
scale of friendly probing actions must however be limited:- The owners of a system will
not wish to disseminate awareness of its residual weaknesses too widely, or to
proliferate expertise in attack methods focused onto their system.
13. Dynamic Defence
A further, quite effective and relatively low-cost defence consists of systematic
periodic changes in the IT configuration, to render the data collected by an attacker
mutually inconsistent - or else consistent but obsolete. Naturally communications and
computer systems adapt continuously to changing hardware configurations, a changing
user population or organisation, changing service requirements, temporary or permanent
changes in traffic-loading patterns, responses to outages or to systems test conditions,
updating of routing tables - or of the weighting parameters in routing algorithms. Their
explicit security features change as passwords and crypto-keys are updated, key-
management systems get up-graded, monitoring facilities evolve, protocols are revised,
etc. In the past, in the name of “configuration control”, the aim was usually to keep a
network static, even at the expense of technical and operational obsolescence. In the
modern, accelerating dynamic environment, systems are (or should be) designed,
operated and managed to respond rapidly to technical and operational developments.
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If a serious reconnaissance attack on an IT system is detected, it should be
possible to take deliberate action to bring about such changes, in the system itself and/or
in its security provisions, to render critical parts of the attacker's reconnaissance
information invalid and irrelevant.
It is more likely that the attacker succeeds in keeping his reconnaissance covert,
in preparation for future passive or active attacks. For large, nation-wide or trans-
national systems, such covert reconnaissance might occupy many months. Hence, in
such systems, an explicit policy of quasi-random changes at a mean interval of, say, 2 or
3 months might ensure that the attacker is for ever chasing his own tail. Since this would
largely make a planned virtue of a natural necessity, it should entail negligible cost.
14. Manning Implications of Restoration/Reconstitution
We have already discussed redundancy and reconfiguration as defences against
physical - or equivalent software - attacks. Quite powerful software tools are available
for automatic adaptation to “normal" changes of availability and capacity. However,
serious damage will demand a sophisticated combination of the recognition of patterns,
assessment of options, weighing up of the balance of conflicting factors, and recognition
of relative importance in a given operational scenario, all of which need human
judgement. The system-monitoring facilities must however provide a user-friendly
interface permitting these judgements to be effectively exercised.
This applies to deciding and implementing the appropriate reconstitution action
and to the initial management of the resulting, reconfigured system This activity can
probably be restricted to a short peak of high-intensity, high-adrenaline effort (say
between 2 and 48 hours). Since manning one post for 24 hours/day, 365 days/year
requires in practice a total of 5 people, it should be possible to double the staff during
such a brief period without any increase in complement. However, provision for fall-
back to less automated operating modes may limit the options for manpower savings.
Any “reserve” staff, to deal with contingencies, must have a meaningful regular task,
which maintains the skills they will need in an emergency.
15. Integrated System Management
Information-system management deals with aspects of connectivity, capacity,
load-factor, quality-of-service, reconfiguration, prioritisation, etc. It is also responsible
for making the best of a system damaged by attack. The management of interface
controllers has to balance some of these considerations against sometimes conflicting
security requirements. Monitoring the pattern of attack attempts, assessing their
significance and co-ordinating any response, has many similarities to conventional
system management. However, it must also use any clues to the methods of the attacker,
his objectives, his capability, the amount of information he may have gleaned, and
possibly to his identity. Such information-security management is best handled as an
explicit, important and substantial enlargement of conventional information-system
management. Systems managers should welcome this enrichment of their function, with
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all its operational importance and professional challenge. This is a very effective action
that can be implemented almost immediately.
16. Prioritisation in the Selection of Defence Options
There is no complete defence against cyber crime, certainly none that is
affordable! We have identified three basic components of fairly universal validity:-
1. Security awareness training.
2. Integrated security and system management
3. System redundancy
TABLE 8: Basic Defence Components
However, there is a further set of defences whose scope nature, scale, and areas
of application, in a resource-limited situation, have to be guided by prioritisation:
4. Bulk encryption of important trunks links
5. End-to-end encryption of important permanent or temporary connections.
6. Appropriate crypto key-distribution systems.
7. Incorporation of authentication and similar features in the crypto schema.
8. The extensive use of trusted secure interface controllers.
9. Dual or triple diversity in critical processors and/or software.
TABLE 9: Higher-Level Defence Components
To achieve this prioritisation, we must:-
1. Relate our IT components to the functions served
2. Identify those IT threats which - if not countered - are sufficiently likely to arise
and sufficiently disastrous operationally that they must be mitigated
3. Identify those defensive measures which:-
•  are most effective against these threats
• are most affordable
• least impair the system's normal operation
• are least system- or scenario-specific
∞ give most collateral benefit the defence of other (lower priority) systems
or functions
∞ give most collateral benefit to the defence of the high-priority systems or
functions against other (lower priority) threats.
TABLE 10: Principles of Prioritisation
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It is then a matter of judgement how far down the resultant list of threats and
countermeasures to go. With given resource constraints, we might have to accept, say, a
remote risk of loss of confidentiality of information to counter the risk of a disastrous
loss of operational capability. Since both the technology and the threat are steadily
evolving, the overall defence policy and its detailed implementation (such as the settings
for specific interface controllers) must be kept under continuing or regular review.
The potential targets to be protected are not just the IT system(s) of the relevant
company or organisation, but:
• All entities within this company or organisation dependent on its IT system(s).
• All entities up-stream from that organisation which provide its input.
• All entities down-stream which accept (and depend on) its output.
• Any entities which rely on two-way real-time interaction with that organisation.
(Since virtually everyone is dependent on telecommunications, energy, water and
transport utilities, and financial services, it is of special importance that all those local or
national, general or dedicated IT systems which are critical to these services are
sufficiently resilient.)
Relative defence priority is essentially the product of impact and probability. The
impact of the threat, if it should materialise, is scaled down by any compartmentation,
which restricts the scope of the damage (but increased by standardisation within the
compartments), and it may also be reduced by any provision for rapid recovery,
provided such recovery significantly lessens the operational effect. The probability of
the threat is essentially the attacker's priority. This is determined mainly by the
“attractiveness” of the target - from his point of view - modified (positively) by his
perception of probability of success and (negatively) by his assessment of likely
resource cost to him, and by the likelihood of his suffering effective retribution. (Even
apart from the above modifying factors, the attacker's priority list is unlikely to be
identical with the defender's, because of their distinct constraints and objectives.)
The suggested combination of impact and probability focuses the defensive
effort onto those systems which come high on both our own impact priority list and our
assessment of the potential attacker's priority list. The defence should then aim to reduce
all these threats to a similar, acceptably-low probability of success, or else to reduce the
impact of any technically successful attack to an acceptably low level.
17. Conclusions
The growing dependence of industry and society on IT, and the growing threat
of cyber crime, require that serious effort be devoted to IT security. Due to
interdependence and interconnection beyond any one system's or organisation's
boundaries and responsibilities, the usual parochial and short-term focus of IT security
is no longer adequate. We must consider the possible impacts on or from, other systems
(often in other organisations), whether caused by accidental hardware, software or
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operational faults, or - as analysed in this paper - by malicious acts, including possibly
by insiders.
By way of conclusions it is appropriate to reiterate the following points:
1. Just as even the best safety-critical systems fail at times, due to an unforeseen
fault or - more typically - combinations of faults, so protection against skilled
determined attackers is unlikely to guarantee complete success. Nevertheless,
much can be done to reduce the danger of such threats.
2. Everyone concerned with the design, acquisition, operation, management or use
of any IT system, on which people or organisations are highly dependent, must
be aware of the relevant security issues and of his own security responsibilities.
3. A realistic security policy must seek to, and in many cases can, limit the impact
of any reasonably likely attack to a (just) tolerable degradation or interruption of
service
4. This degree of immunity can in many cases be achieved at a tolerable marginal
cost in system procurement and operation, coupled with a tolerable degradation
of the quality of “normal” service to the user.
5. This does not merely entail technical measures, such as fault tolerance,
encryption, compartmentation, etc., but it also requires continued close
supervision by well-informed management.
6. One important strategy, especially when using limited-security systems and sub-
systems, involves placement of (justifiably) trusted interface controllers to
monitor and restrict information flow at appropriate points, both between sub-
systems and between a system and the outside world - including its own users.
(Internet “firewalls” are one attempt at such interface control.)
7. Such interface controllers necessarily impose limitations on the facilities
provided to users, and on the forms of system interconnection permitted.
8. The security measures must be- and must be seen to be - both technically
adequate, and operationally acceptable. Only then will they be loyally adhered to
by all involved.
9. Without careful attention to these issues, the uncontrolled interconnection of
existing systems, many on which people and organisations are critically
dependent, will continue to create huge, ill-defined and defenceless super -
systems.
10. The price of protection against from cyber crime is eternal IT security
vigilance.
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